

VV 15A254NJC26  
OO RUEHHH  
DE RUEHLE 4136/1 153113  
ZNY CCCCC ZNY  
O R 021100Z JUL 79  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4101  
INFO RUEHOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1021  
RUEHNS/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1644  
RUEHAI/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4891  
RUEHMB/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0211  
BT  
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 2 KAEUL 4234

I.C. 120001 N/A  
TAGS: EAD, FEPR, PINS, AF, US  
SUBJ: SENATE AMENDMENT ON AID TO AFGHANISTAN  
REF: STATE 151846

1. (LOW - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. WHILE THIS EMBASSY IS MOST SYMPATHETIC TOWARD THE SENTIMENTS WHICH PROMPTED THE FELL-LONGE AMENDMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1979 (REFTEL), WE QUESTION WHETHER THAT AMENDMENT WOULD SERVE OVERALL U.S. INTERESTS IN THIS AREA. END SUMMARY.

3. WE SHARE THE CONGRESS'S AND THE DEPARTMENT'S DESIRE TO LEARN THE WHOLE TRUTH ABOUT THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE TRAGIC KIDNAPPING AND ASSASSINATION OF AMBASSADOR DUES AND WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING THE DRA TO BE FORTHCOMING IN THAT REGARD. WE CONSIDER IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THIS REGIME WILL EVER APOLOGIZE OFFICIALLY FOR ITS HANDLING OF THE INCIDENT, LET ALONE ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S DEATH.

4. THE UTILITY OF THE AMENDMENT'S REQUIREMENT THAT "THE DRA AGREE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR ALL USG PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN HIMSELF LARGELY ON WHAT IS MEANT BY "ADEQUATE." THE DRA DOES PROVIDE GUARDS FOR USG FACILITIES IN KABUL, FOR THE CHARGE, AND, AS REQUESTED, FOR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. IT ALSO PROVIDES A GUARD TO ACCOMPANY THE AMERICAN SCHOOL'S BUSES. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD INHIBIT THE FULFILLMENT OF OUR FUNCTIONS WERE WE TO REQUEST AND RECEIVE BODYGUARDS FOR ALL USG PERSONNEL. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO WAY OF GUARANTEEING THAT A DETERMINED, WELL-PLANNED TERRORIST ATTACK ON USG PERSONNEL WOULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL, NO MATTER HOW MANY DRA GUARDS MIGHT BE ASSIGNED TO PROTECT SUCH PERSONNEL.

5. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY "SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN AFGHANISTAN" OF THE KIND ENVISAGED BY THE AMENDMENT'S SECTION 8 WILL PROBABLY DEPEND ON FACTORS EXTRANEIOUS TO THE DUBS TRAGEDY. WE WOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT A KEY FIGURE IN THAT INCIDENT, SAIED SHAOH TARDON, HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THE POLICE CHIEF POSITION HE HELD AT THAT TIME. WE ARE NOT SURE WHETHER TARDON'S TRANSFER REPRESENTS A DEMOTION OR PROMOTION OR WHETHER IT IS AT ALL RELATED TO HIS HANDLING OF THE AMBASSADOR'S KIDNAPPING.

6. WE ARE VERY MINDFUL OF AMBASSADOR DUBS' OWN VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE US HAS FEW INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN, PER SE. ACCORDINGLY, HE FELT THAT THE USG SHOULD LOOK ON AFGHANISTAN PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF REGIONAL STABILITY. HE STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT AFGHANISTAN SHOULD NOT BECOME A DESTABILIZING FACTOR AND THAT WE SHOULD COOPERATE WITH OTHER NATIONS, INCLUDING THE FREE NATIONS OF THIS AREA, IN SEEKING TO OFFER THE AFGHANS AN ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE TO THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION.

7. DURING ITS 15 MONTHS OF RULE, THE DRA HAS MOVED INCREASINGLY CLOSER TO MOSCOW AND HAS ACCUSED ITS OTHER THREE NEIGHBORS, PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND CHINA, OF MEDDLING IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS (NOTABLY THE GROWING ANTI-REGIME DISSIDENCE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE). WE PRESENTLY SEE NO SIGNS THAT THE DRA WILL SHIFT ITS POLICIES AWAY FROM THE RADICAL, PRO-SOVIET LINE THAT IT NOW ISPOUSES, AND NO SIGNS THAT THE ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES WILL ABATE.

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4182

INFO RUSSCD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8822

RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1545

RUSBAZ/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6892

RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0214

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 4236

6. NONETHELESS, WE CONSIDER IT IN THE USG'S INTERESTS AND IN THE INTERESTS OF REGIONAL STABILITY FOR THE PRESIDENT TO HAVE THE OPTION OF CONTINUING AID DISBURSEMENTS FOR AT LEAST THE PIPELINE. EVEN THOUGH THE PRESENT AFGHAN REGIME'S LEADERSHIP OFTEN BEHAVES IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO US DESIRES AND INTERESTS, WE KNOW THAT THERE ARE AFGHANS OUTSIDE THE REGIME AND SOME PERHAPS WITHIN IT WHO VALUE A CONTINUED, THOUGH LIMITED, U.S. AID PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. OUR AID PROJECTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT MEETING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AND SERVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO HAVE HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS ABOUT IMPOVERISHED AFGHANISTAN AND ITS PEOPLE, NOTWITHSTANDING THE LEADERSHIP'S SOMETIMES HOSTILE STANCE. WE WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT, TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, NONE OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE USG CUT OFF ALL AID TO AFGHANISTAN. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY SEEM TO FEEL IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST THAT THE USG MAINTAIN AT LEAST A MODEST AID PRESENCE HERE. THE MAINTENANCE OF SUCH A PRESENCE WOULD, HOWEVER, ENABLE THE USG TO RESPOND MORE RAPIDLY TO ANY FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE DOMESTIC AFGHAN POLITICAL SCENE.

9. WITH REGARD TO THE PIPELINE, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WE HAVE 15 AFGHANS STUDYING IN THE U.S. AND 23 AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT UNDER AID-FINANCED PROGRAMS. WERE WE TO BE FORCED TO CUT PIPELINE EXPENDITURES, THOSE STUDENTS MIGHT HAVE TO TERMINATE THEIR STUDIES THROUGH NO FAULT OF THEIR OWN. THIS, WE BELIEVE, WOULD NOT BE IN THE USG'S INTEREST.

10. SUMMING UP, WE HOPE THAT THE DEPARTMENT WILL SEEK TO PERSUADE CONGRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT MUST BE GIVEN A FASTER AND THAN THE PELL-STONE AGREEMENT WOULD AUTHORIZE IN DECIDING WHETHER OVERALL U.S. INTERESTS MILITATE FOR A CONTINUATION OF A MODEST LEVEL OF AID TO AFGHANISTAN. AS BETWEEN THE PELL-STONE AND DERWINSKI AGREEMENTS, WE CLEARLY PREFER THE LATTER.

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